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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a large-scale, global infrastructure project 
introduced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The primary goal is to invest in 
infrastructure projects across Eurasia and Africa in an effort to improve regional 
connectivity. This research explains who participates in the BRI through cross-country 
quantitative analysis and two in-depth qualitative case studies. Through a logit analysis of 
political economy factors such as GDP per capita, FDI inflows, aid data, and others, I 
find that economic need is a significant predictor of membership as well as previous 
involvement in Chinese organizations such as the AIIB. Two case studies into prominent 
BRI members – Kazakhstan and Italy – explore why different countries decide to 
participate, and the economic benefits and political controversies following that decision. 
Kazakhstan was the first official member of the initiative and was where Chinese 
President Xi Jinping announced the commencement of the BRI’s overland section. Italy 
joined in 2019 and was the first of the G7, and largest EU economy, to join. Overall, this 
project will allow for an understanding of why so many nations are joining the BRI and 
what participation signifies. This analysis is important due to the complex nature of the 
BRI and the varying responses and impacts it has generated worldwide, including 
immense criticism within the United States and many of their allies. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
     Since Chinese President Deng Xiaoping began his reforms of the Chinese government 
and economy in 1978, China has launched into the global arena at an unprecedented rate. 
The Chinese economy has gone from a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of around 0.1 
trillion USD in 1978 to over $14 trillion in 2018, making it the second-largest economy 
in the world.1 By 2009, China was exporting more goods than any other nation and they 
became the largest trading nation by 2013.2 Similar growth has been seen in China’s 
military, which has risen to be the second-best funded in the world behind the U.S.3 
     One way we see this emergence of China to the global stage is through overseas 
initiatives. In November 2012, Xi Jinping was announced as the leader of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and the head of the Chinese military.4 Soon after, in March 
2013, Xi was elected President of the People’s Republic of China.5 Later that year, 
President Xi announced his plans for an ambitious infrastructure plan aimed to help 
bolster Eurasian connectivity with China. Xi proposed this project as a revitalization of 
the ancient Silk Road and called it the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century 
 
1 Phillip Inman and Lily Kuo, “China Feels the Squeeze of Trump’s Trade War as More Tariffs Loom | 
Business | The Guardian,” The Guardian, January 5, 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jan/05/china-economy-slowdown-us-tariffs-trade-war. 
2 Jonathan Woetzel et al., “China and the World: Inside a Changing Economic Relationship | McKinsey,” 
July 2019, https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/china/china-and-the-world-inside-the-dynamics-
of-a-changing-relationship. 
3 Ben Westcott, “China’s Military Is Going from Strength to Strength under Xi Jinping,” CNN, March 4, 
2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/04/asia/china-military-xi-jinping-intl/index.html. 
4 Tania Branigan, “Xi Jinping Takes Reins of Communist Party and Chinese Military,” The Guardian, 
November 15, 2012, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/15/xi-jinping-
communist-party-chinese. 
5 Tania Branigan, “Xi Jinping Becomes China’s President,” The Guardian, March 14, 2013, sec. World 
news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/14/xi-jinping-installed-china-president. 
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Maritime Silk Road, or the One Belt One Road (OBOR).6 It later came to be known as 
the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI. While many nations have joined the initiative with 
hopes of buoying their economy through infrastructure investment, boosting economic 
growth, or perhaps simply coming closer to China diplomatically, there has also been 
much criticism. Critics, including the U.S. and Germany, warn nations that the BRI is a 
debt trap and should be avoided.7 It is unclear if the warnings of the critics should be 
heeded, and if the joiners are making a serious strategic error. 
     The goal of this thesis is to examine the motivations of the BRI, particularly of the 
member states. It asks the question: why do states join? The first chapter will detail what 
the BRI is, according to President Xi Jinping and experts on China and Eurasia, and the 
goals of the initiative. The second chapter will include information about all participating 
members of the BRI. This section will discuss trends in national data which may indicate 
why one nation decides to participate and another does not. These national data sets 
include national GDP, GDP per capita, foreign bilateral aid flows, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) inflows, debt stocks, and Chinese aid data. I find that smaller and poor 
economies are more likely to join the BRI, holding all else equal and controlling for other 
political economy factors. Additionally, a nation’s involvement in the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) increases the likelihood of BRI membership. 
These data indicate why one nation may be prone to join the BRI, while another is not, 
however it does not tell the whole story. For this, an analysis of the motivation of 
individual member nations is required.   
 
6 Catherine Trautwein, “All Roads Lead to China: The Belt and Road Initiative, Explained,” FRONTLINE, 
June 26, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/all-roads-lead-to-china-the-belt-and-road-
initiative-explained/. 
7 Ibid. 
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     In order to look deeper into the whole story of why some nations join the BRI, the 
third and fourth chapters of this thesis will consist of two case studies into BRI 
participating nations. The first case study is Kazakhstan. This case study was picked 
because Kazakhstan was where President Xi Jinping first chose to announce the BRI. 
Kazakhstan has a long history with China, is a bordering nation, and is one of the first 
BRI members, allowing for an examination of how well the BRI is working for a long-
standing member and what being a member means for a country that already had a strong 
relationship with China. The second case study is Italy, one of the most recent nations to 
announce their participation in the BRI. A case study into Italy’s BRI membership helps 
examine why some European nations may decide to participate, as well as why others are 
critical of the initiative, because Italy is the largest European Union (EU) member to have 
joined so far and the first of the G7 nations. This case study will also help see how the 
BRI is working for nations which do not border China and were not in the initial plan, as 
Kazakhstan was, helping to see how the BRI has evolved since its announcement in 2013. 
     The thesis will then conclude by putting all of the national data together, along with 
the examination into the two case studies, to answer the questions: What factors have 
driven so many nations to sign onto the Belt and Road Initiative and what results of these 
relationships can already be seen? Are there common factors that drive nations to form 
relationships with China, besides a common need for improved infrastructure? Why are 
some nations forming bonds with China while others are holding back? This thesis is 
intended to try to answer those questions and give a look into the ever-rising role of 
China and the BRI in the global arena. 
 
 4 
CHAPTER I 
WHAT IS THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE? 
The Announcement 
     The Belt and Road Initiative was first announced by President Xi Jinping during an 
official state visit to Kazakhstan on September 7, 2013. During that visit, President Xi 
gave a speech unveiling his plans for the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” an overland 
collection of trade routes through Eurasia. The second half of the BRI, the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road, was announced later that year during President Xi’s visit to 
Indonesia. Together, the two parts of the project were coined the “One Belt, One Road” 
initiative.8 The name was later changed to the Belt and Road Initiative in 2016. The 
change was intended to move away from the term “one” which often created confusion 
that the initiative only included one road and one maritime route, which created 
unnecessary competition in the region.9  
     In his announcement, President Xi described the plans for the initiative as consisting 
of a large system of railways, roads, maritime routes, pipelines, and more passing 
throughout Asia and Eastern Europe, and extending overseas into Eastern Africa. The 
plans also called for the creation of 50 special economic zones. These would be modeled 
after the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, which was created in the 1950s under the 
 
8 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, May 21, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative. 
9 Una Alexander Berzina-Cherenkova, “BRI Instead of OBOR – China Edits the English Name of its Most 
Ambitious International Project,” July 28, 2016, https://www.lai.lv/viedokli/bri-instead-of-obor-china-
edits-the-english-name-of-its-most-ambitious-international-project-532. 
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leadership of Deng Xiaoping. The plan also called for the construction of maritime ports 
in nations that border the Indian Ocean, from Southeast Asia to East Africa.10 
 
Chinese Intentions 
     President Xi Jinping has stated from the beginning of the initiative that the Chinese 
intentions for the BRI are to increase connectivity throughout Eurasia and promote trade, 
economic growth, and infrastructure development. On November 8, 2014, President Xi 
gave a speech in Beijing at the APEC Summit during which he described his, and 
China’s, goals for the future of Eurasia, particularly regarding the BRI.11 He stated that 
increasing Asian connectivity and development is a top priority for China. Specifically, 
President Xi said he wants to “break the bottleneck in Asian connectivity” and that the 
best way to do this is through the BRI, as well as the Silk Road Fund.12 This “bottleneck” 
is likely referring to low levels of land trade across Central Asia. As of 2019, the amount 
of goods transported overland across the region was less than 2% of what is transported 
by sea.13 The bottleneck will be broken through an increased economic flow, creation of 
jobs, increased investment, and cultural exchange across the continent.14  
     In his speech, President Xi compared the new initiative to the ancient Silk Road which 
connected China to the rest of Eurasia through a vast network of trading routes. He said 
the ancient Silk Road shows how humanity has always strived for increased connectivity 
 
10 Ibid.  
11 Xi Jinping, “Connectivity Spearheads Development and Partnership Enables Cooperation,” accessed 
August 20, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceindo/eng/jrzg/t1211795.htm. 
12 Ibid. 
13 “Enhancing Connectivity and Freight in Central Asia” (International Transport Forum, 2019), 
https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/connectivity-freight-central-asia.pdf. 
14 Hui Lu et al., China Belt and Road Initiative: Measuring the Impact of Improving Transportation 
Connectivity on Trade in the Region (RAND Corporation, 2018). 
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and the new Belt and Road project is the opportunity to gain that connectivity back in the 
modern world, especially since, as Xi claimed, connectivity, trade, and economic growth 
have declined worldwide since the 2008 financial crisis. Xi stated that with the backdrop 
of the global economic situation, and ever-advancing technology, this is the time for 
Asian nations to work together again to build up a community of trade and advancement 
through the BRI.15 
     President Xi stated in this speech that it is important for all Asian nations to work 
together to achieve this goal of increased connectivity. He discussed that there are many 
challenges to reaching their goals. These challenges include that wide diversity of 
systems and the need for money, as this is a very costly endeavor. They must, Xi said, 
build a more open economy in Asia and the peoples of the continent need to be brought 
together. Overall, President Xi said to the assembled world leaders that their goal is 
advancement, prosperity, and connectivity. He stated:  
 “We need to realize the Asian people’s dream for happiness. Each new transport 
 route carries on it people’s dream for happiness. In stepping up connectivity in 
 Asia, we will open more windows for people to observe the world, pursue their 
 dreams, and broaden their path to move from poverty to prosperity.”16 
 
     Beyond what President Xi himself as said, Hong Yu of the East Asian Institute at the 
National University of Singapore conducted a study in 2016 into the motivation behind 
the BRI.17 In this study, he wrote the major goal of China with the BRI, besides improved 
connectivity and trade, is an increase in geoeconomic and geopolitical influence in the 
region, and worldwide. Through the establishment of the BRI, China will be able to gain 
 
15 Xi Jinping 
16 Ibid. 
17 Hong Yu, “Motivation behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank,” Journal of Contemporary China 26, no. 105 (May 4, 2017): 353–68. 
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access to energy and natural resources from other Asian nations such as Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Russia. This increase in geoeconomic power and geopolitical 
influence will help them continue to stimulate economic growth within China and drive 
their economic interests abroad. The BRI is an excellent project through which China can 
strengthen their ties with the global community and exert their economic might upon the 
rest of Eurasia, particularly in a world of ever-growing global interdependence.18   
     China’s major objective with the BRI, as stated by Hung Yu, is to “maintain friendly 
neighborhood relations by promoting regional economic integration and improving 
regional connectivity, in order to achieve primacy in the region and beyond.”19 President 
Xi wants China to be the leader in improving Eurasian connectivity and promoting trade 
and infrastructure development across the continent. Infrastructure development through 
the BRI, a major key to economic prosperity, will boost trade, economic growth, and 
regional connectivity. Indeed, Asia already has accounted for over 50% of China’s 
foreign investment in the last decade and Chinese ports lead the world in global shipping 
and cargo transportation.20 The BRI, President Xi hopes, will be the key to making China 
a global economic power, expanding the use and strength of Chinese currency, and will 
allow Eurasia to become fully interconnected and prosperous again, as in the days of the 
ancient Silk Road. 
     While discussions of the BRI have been largely focused around the international 
aspects of the initiative, it also is intended to promote domestic growth in China. 
President Xi intends the initiative to help promote and support China’s economy. One 
 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 357 
20 Ibid. 
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way the BRI is being used increase China’s economic growth is through its connection 
with the Made in China 2025 plan which was started in 2015. Five of the ten technology 
industries this project is working to upgrade are linked to the success of the BRI.21 The 
BRI is intended to promote domestic growth in other ways too, including lessening the 
development gap between China’s coast and the rest of the nation, improving their energy 
security, and “expand [their] circle of friends” in order to gain entry into new foreign 
markets.22 
     Furthermore, China hopes that the BRI will help promote sustainable growth in their 
economy by tackling their excess capacity issue. Excess capacity is the result of an 
imbalance in the supply versus demand of a product. This causes a downturn in economic 
growth. China has faced this issue with a number of goods, particularly steel and iron.23 
One way to solve the issue of excess capacity is to increase external demand. The nations 
joining the BRI will “provide new markets for China’s enormous excess of manufactured 
products and construction capacity.”24 This will then begin to address the excess capacity 
issue in China and allow for continued domestic economic growth.  
 
 
 
 
21 Nadége Rolland, “A Concise Guide to the Belt and Road Initiative,” The National Bureau of Asian 
Research (NBR) (blog), April 11, 2019, https://www.nbr.org/publication/a-guide-to-the-belt-and-road-
initiative/. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Hu Caimei, “To Eliminate Excess Capacity - China Development Institute,” China Development 
Institute, accessed March 24, 2020, http://en.cdi.org.cn/component/k2/item/298-to-eliminate-excess-
capacity. 
24 Yu, 358 
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Where is it? 
    “Covering 65 countries and reaching 62% of the global population, all the while 
 accounting for nearly a third of global GDP and approximately 35% of global 
 merchandise trade, the BRI is arguably the most ambitious example of global 
 economic statecraft in the twenty-first century.”25 
 
     Upon its announcement, China stated that the Belt and Road Initiative covered the 
area that was part of the ancient Silk Road. However, China also maintained that the BRI 
was not limited to these nations and was open to all nations who wished to contribute to 
the initiative’s stated goal of connectivity. By August of 2015, the China International 
Trade Institute reported that 65 countries, including China, had been confirmed as 
participating members of the BRI. This number included much of Asia, parts of the 
Middle East and North Africa, and a large amount of Eastern European nations. Together, 
these nations contained, as of that time, 62.3% of the world’s population and accounted 
for 30% of global GDP.26 
     Today, it is unclear what it means for a nation to be a BRI member. There exists little 
information concerning the exact number of nations that are participating or what actually 
constitutes a state becoming a BRI member. Some studies and articles put the number 
well above 100. China themselves often cite any nation that has received infrastructure 
development aid, or other types of aid, from China since 2013 as a member. This includes 
nations across Eurasia, Africa, and Central and South America. As of April 2019, China 
has begun an attempt at defining what exactly must be present in the relationship between 
 
25 Wenxian Zhang, Ilan Alon, and Christoph Lattemann, eds., China’s Belt Road Initiative: Changing the 
Rules of Globalization, Palgrave Studies of Internationalization in Emerging Markets (Cham, Switzerland: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2018)., 25 
26 Helen Chin and Winnie He, “The Belt and Road Initiative: 65 Countries and Beyond” (Fung Business 
Intelligence Centre, May 2016), 
https://www.fbicgroup.com/sites/default/files/B%26R_Initiative_65_Countries_and_Beyond.pdf. 
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China and foreign nations for that state to be considered a BRI member. President Xi has 
recognized a rise in the use of the term BRI to include almost all deals with China, which 
has hurt the initiative’s reputation in many parts of the world. He is seeking to clarify 
who is, and is not, a BRI member for this reason. For now, however, it is still unclear 
how many nations are truly BRI members or would self-identify as such.27 
     In order to begin my analysis of national motivations for BRI participation, I first had 
to find a solution to the membership ambiguity problem. I analyzed global data that may 
indicate membership, such as the existence of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
between China and another nation, if a nation attended the BRI forums, and if they have 
completed Chinese infrastructure projects within their borders. By the end of this 
analyses, I had identified 90 nations as members of the BRI. This included all nations 
which had signed official MoU’s with China as well as a few that attended both BRI 
forums and had recognized BRI projects that had been undertaken in their country. While 
that list may not include every country which could be considered a member, it is a best 
assessment of the true extent of the BRI. A more detailed description of the analysis 
process that went into this list can be found in Chapter II.  
 
 
27 “China Moves to Define ‘Belt and Road’ Projects for First Time,” Bloomberg.Com, April 3, 2019, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-03/china-moves-to-define-belt-and-road-projects-for-
first-time. 
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CHAPTER II 
WHY DO NATIONS PARTICIPATE? 
Global Participation 
     President Xi Jinping initially marketed the Belt and Road Initiative toward Eurasian 
nations, aimed at improving connectivity and economic prosperity in the region. Today, 
the initiative has achieved a global presence well beyond Eurasia. In addition to Asia and 
eastern Europe, participating members include western European states, northern and 
sub-Saharan Africa, and Central and South America. These participating countries 
include some allies of the United States, which is a strong critic of the BRI, as well as 
nations which are members of the European Union and NATO. Why would these states 
want to join the BRI? Why do any nations want to join the BRI? In this section I will 
detail my research into BRI participation and my findings of common factors that may 
indicate why any nation, worldwide, would seek the form this alliance with China. 
 
Methodology 
     In order to understand why nations choose to participate in the BRI, I first had to 
figure out which nations are members and which are not, and document what year they 
became members. In order to do this, I created a list of all 193 United Nations recognized 
countries in the world and identified a number of factors which may indicate membership 
in the BRI. These factors include the signing of an MoU, the existence of an official 
public announcement, Chinese infrastructure projects in the nation and the year of the 
first project, and whether that nation attended the BRI forums in 2017 or 2019.  
 12 
     Sources of these data varied and was challenging to complete. The easiest to find was 
the information on which national leaders attended the BRI forums, as this was publicly 
and consistently documented. Other information was more difficult, such as who had 
signed MoU’s or made public announcements. The information on the existence of 
infrastructure projects was ultimately nearly impossible to find. This measure would be 
important to examine in future research.  
     Once I had found as much information as I could about the levels of involvement each 
nation had with China since 2013, I was able to determine which states I would consider 
members for the purposes of my study. MoU’s were considered to be the best indicator of 
participation, so all nations which had signed an MoU were automatically placed in the 
member category. Most nations that had not signed MoU’s were considered non-
members, as that means there is no official statement between that nation and China 
claiming membership. However, there were some exceptions. I eventually placed some 
states which did not have MoU’s into the members category. These were nations that had 
attended the BRI forums and/or had an officially recognized BRI infrastructure project 
that had been undertaken, even though I could find no information about an official 
declaration or MoU being signed. A spreadsheet of measurements used to determine 
possible BRI participation can be found in the Appendix.  
     This conclusion left me with a lower number of members than other sources, 
including China, often state. However, some of these sources identify all Chinese aid data 
since the 2013 BRI announcement to be part of the initiative, meaning any nation 
obtaining investments or aid from China during this time would be considered a member. 
I determined that this was a broad and ambiguous definition of BRI membership. In an 
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effort to ensure the most accurate results of my study, I opted to not include many of 
these nations. Instead, my study sought mutual official recognition of participation from 
China as well as the other nation in order to confirm their membership in the BRI. This 
study concluded with finding 90 nations that were officially recognized as BRI members 
under my criteria, a list of which can be found in the Appendix.   
     After determining which nations are BRI members, and the years they became 
members, the next step was determining factors that might indicate why these nations 
would opt-in to the initiative. These factors were examined together for all participating 
and non-participating states to look for correlations between the data and BRI 
membership or non-membership. I examined the following factors: national GDP, GDP 
per capita, aid inflows from the U.S., Japan, EU, and the UK, debt stocks, FDI inflows, 
UN affinity scores with the U.S. and China, capital distance from Beijing, if they share a 
border with China, whether they are an AIIB signatory, number of Chinese aid projects, 
and if they are located along the ancient Silk Road. The following sections details why I 
examined these data sets and what my hypotheses were for my findings. 
 
Predictions 
     My predictions for the results of my tests were based on results of previous studies 
into these factors and my analysis of how those studies might relate to the BRI. A 
summary of my data and predictions can be seen in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Summary of the variables tested for correlation of likelihood to join the BRI, with minimum, mean, 
and maximum of each data set provided, as well as the predicted result. 
Variable Minimum Mean Maximum Prediction 
GDP (USD) 26,288,648 262,663,613,2
81 
13,793,333,333,300 - 
GDP-PC 
(USD) 
187.1 12,131.2 139,767.0 - 
Debt Stocks 
(USD) 
17,989,034 25,629,278,54
6 
360,000,000,000 + 
U.S. Aid 
(USD) 
-236,160,000 1,099,264,410 33,726,110,000 - 
Japan Aid 
(USD) 
-2,723,720,000 406,141,897 12,788,860,000 - 
EU Aid 
(USD) 
-156,330,000 646,498,359 14,655,570,000 - 
UK Aid 
(USD) 
-169,530,000 346,167,487 7,829,400,000 - 
China Aid 
(USD) 
0 1,085,471,825 36,296,766,554 + 
FDI Inflow 
(USD) 
-3.504 7.951 441.022 - 
U.S. Affinity 0.06811 0.26279 1.00000 - 
China 
Affinity 
0.1551 0.7346 0.9156 + 
Capital 
Distance 
(km) 
820 8993 19275 - 
Border 
China 
No (179)  Not applicable Yes (14) + 
AIIB 
Signatory 
No (114) Not applicable Yes (75) + 
Ancient Silk 
Road 
No (142) Not applicable Yes (47) + 
China Aid 
Projects 
0 23.74 177 + 
+ predicted positive correlation; - predicted negative correlation  
 
     Previous studies have found that there is a positive relationship between infrastructure 
development, particularly transportation infrastructure, and a nation’s debt-to-GDP ratio. 
This means investment into transportation infrastructure can help increase economic 
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output, and thus GDP, which will help a nation in times of high debt.28 The BRI is, 
primarily, an infrastructure investment project, and a large percentage of this 
infrastructure is based around transportation in order to increase trade and regional 
connectivity. Based on this past research, it appears that BRI involvement, and the 
infrastructure investment and development that follows, would help increase a nations 
GDP and GDP per capita, which will then help decrease their national debt. Thus, I 
predicted that a nation with a higher debt-to-GDP ratio previous to BRI involvement 
would be more likely to agree to membership in order to improve this ratio and their 
economy. This means, based on my prediction, that a nation with a lower GDP and/or a 
lower GDP per capita would be more likely to join the BRI. Likewise, a nation with 
higher debt stocks would be more inclined to join. 
     Aid inflows from the U.S. were another indicator of BRI involvement that I 
considered. Since the end of World War One, the U.S. has been a global superpower with 
investments worldwide, becoming the only superpower after the Cold War. During that 
time, post-World War Two, we have lived in a world of Pax Americana: a period of 
relative global peace that has been attributed to American power and dominance.29 
Additionally, the U.S. was, for a long time, the largest global aid contributor. Since the 
2008 financial crisis, this American power has weakened, opening a growing global 
power-vacuum. This has led many to wonder, with the rise of Chinese economic power, 
whether the world has begun a “transition from a Pax Americana to a Pax Sinica.”30  
 
28 Doron Lavee, Gilat Beniad, and Charles Solomon, “The Effect of Investment in Transportation 
Infrastructure on the Debt-to-GDP Ratio,” Transport Reviews 31, no. 6 (November 1, 2011): 769–89. 
29 Christopher Layne, “The US--Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana,” International 
Affairs 94, no. 1 (January 2018): 89–111. 
30 Wenxian Zhang, Ilan Alon, and Christoph Lattemann, eds., China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Cham: 
Springer International Publishing, 2018) 
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     Due to this decline in U.S. global presence, nations may begin to turn to China to 
make up for that loss, which I predict would be particularly seen through foreign aid 
inflows. China has steadily risen their foreign aid investments, even before the BRI. In 
fact, by 2009, China’s commitment to foreign development aid was two times the 
commitment by the U.S., and China has remained the top global aid contributor ever 
since, particularly now due to the large amounts of aid flowing to BRI members.31 This 
subsequent decline in U.S. global leadership and rise in Chinese leadership led me to 
predict that a nation with lower amounts of incoming aid from the U.S. may be more 
likely to join the BRI in an effort to ensure they will have a continued supply of foreign 
investments into their economy and infrastructure development. Companies with more 
aid from the U.S., I then predict, may be less likely to join the BRI. This may be because 
those nations do not need the investment from China. Another possible reason would be 
that nations with high U.S. aid are likely allies of the U.S., and the Trump administration 
has been very cautious of Chinese investment, encouraging allies to “bar Chinese 
investment in 5G and other telecom infrastructure.”32 
     In addition to U.S. aid, I also examined the relation of BRI membership to Japan, 
United Kingdom, and European Union aid inflows. Similar to the U.S., Japan and the 
EU, as well as many EU member-states, have remained wary of Chinese investment 
and the BRI. In 2019, the EU and Japan signed their own free-trade agreement, the 
biggest in the world, and a “massive infrastructure deal to increase connectivity 
 
31 “Five Countries That Provide the Largest Foreign Aid,” The Borgen Project, March 14, 2018, 
https://borgenproject.org/five-countries-that-give-the-largest-foreign-aid/. 
32 Andrew Chatzky, “China’s Belt and Road Gets a Win in Italy,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 
2019, https://www.cfr.org/article/chinas-belt-and-road-gets-win-italy. 
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between Asia and Europe,” seen partly as their response to the BRI.33 Through this 
deal, and since the beginning of the BRI, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has 
been marketing Japan as a “‘quality’ infrastructure alternative” to China.34 Based on 
this agreement and Japan’s concerns and responses to the BRI, I predicted that 
nations with a higher amount of aid inflows from Japan would be less likely to join 
the BRI, because they would more likely share the views of Japan and seek to 
participate in trade agreements such as this one, rather that the BRI. 
     I made the same prediction for aid coming from the EU and the UK. Both the UK, 
and the EU as a whole, can be seen to be cautious of China’s initiative. In fact, when 
discussing the new trade and infrastructure deals with Japan, the President of the 
European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, stated: “connectivity must be 
sustainable in financial terms. We must bequeath to the next generation a more 
interconnected world, a cleaner environment and not mountains of debt. It’s also a 
question of creating interconnections between all countries in the world and not 
merely dependence on one country.”35 While China was not directly mentioned, 
many listeners felt it was clear this comment was directed at China and the BRI. 
Thus, with this in mind, I anticipated that nations with more aid from the EU, and the 
UK, would be less likely to join the BRI out of a shared concern for Chinese investment. 
     Next, I predicted that FDI inflow amounts may be an indicator of potential BRI 
involvement. FDI is when a foreign national or business owns at least 10% of a domestic 
company. Developing nations rely on these investments in order to expand their goods 
 
33 William Pesek, “EU-Japan Axis Emerges to Counter China’s BRI,” Asia Times, October 9, 2019, 
https://asiatimes.com/2019/10/eu-japan-axis-emerges-to-counter-chinas-bri/. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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into international markets and build up their economy.36 Knowing that this reliance on 
FDI exists, I predicted that nations with lower investment inflows would be more likely 
to join the BRI in order to increase foreign investor amounts. Additionally, global FDI 
has fallen drastically since 2017, being down 13%, perhaps partly due to U.S. President 
Trump’s tax cuts.37 This means more nations may be turning to China and the BRI in 
order to fill this investment void that has been left by U.S. companies. 
     Next I analyzed UN affinity scores with the U.S. and with China. Previous research 
indicates that nations which vote more often with the U.S. at the UN are more likely to 
form treaties amongst each other than other nations.38 Relating this tendency to the U.S. 
criticism of the BRI may indicate that nations which vote alongside the U.S. at the UN 
may be less likely to join the BRI because they have a higher probability of maintaining 
similar views as the U.S. This research may also hold true for nations that vote alongside 
China more often at the UN. This means those nations would be more likely to sign 
treaties or agreements with China. With that in mind, I predicted that nations which have 
a higher UN affinity score with China would have a higher probability of joining the BRI 
while nations with a higher affinity score with the U.S. would have a lower probability of 
joining. 
     Next, I predicted that nations which have capitals closer to Beijing, and particularly 
those nations which border China, would be more prone to join the BRI. This is because 
trade and business are easier to conduct between two nations with a close proximity to 
 
36 Amadeo Kimberly, “Foreign Direct Investment, How FDI Affects Your Life,” The Balance, February 19, 
2020, https://www.thebalance.com/foreign-direct-investment-fdi-pros-cons-and-importance-3306283. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Maurice A. East and Phillip M. Gregg, “Factors Influencing Cooperation and Conflict in the International 
System,” International Studies Quarterly 11, no. 3 (September 1967): 244. 
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each other. A nation that is bordering China is much more likely to cooperate with a 
Chinese investment project than a country that is thousands of miles away because it is 
easier and makes sense to cooperate with their neighbors. Additionally, President Xi 
intends the BRI to improve regional connectivity. This means he will likely pursue the 
membership of nearby Asian, European, and North Africa nations more than those far 
away. This does not mean nations which are located geographically far from China will 
not be members, or that President Xi is not interested in their involvement, just that I 
predict those nations which are closer have a higher probability of membership. 
     The AIIB is an international bank founded by China in 2015. President Xi’s intention 
for the bank is to fund infrastructure development across Asia: meaning a funding 
mechanism for the BRI.39 Due to the AIIB’s direct link to the BRI, I decided to analyze 
the relationship between a nation being an AIIB signatory and a BRI member. While I 
recognized that participation in the AIIB does not guarantee membership in China’s 
initiative, such as with France and Germany which are AIIB signatories but critics of the 
BRI, I predicted that nations which are AIIB signatories will have a higher probability of 
being BRI members. I also predicted this membership relationship because previous 
research indicates that nations that join one international organization are likely to join 
others as well to try to gain the most benefits from membership. Additionally, existing 
alliances and trade partnerships increase the chance of shared membership in 
 
39 Jane Perlez, “China Creates a World Bank of Its Own, and the U.S. Balks,” The New York Times, 
December 4, 2015, sec. Business, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/business/international/china-
creates-an-asian-bank-as-the-us-stands-aloof.html. 
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international organizations, so, I predicted, a nation that is already allied with China 
through the AIIB will be more likely to join the BRI as well.40 
     Lastly, I analyzed BRI membership compared to the route of the ancient Silk Road. 
The BRI is intended as a revitalization of the ancient Silk Road. In the official action plan 
for the initiative, it is stated that, “It covers, but is not limited to, the area of the ancient 
Silk Road.”41 Therefore, I predicted that, while any country may join, nations which are 
geographically located along the old trade routes of the Silk Road will be more likely to 
join the BRI than others. 
 
Results 
     I used a logit model to test for the correlation of BRI membership probability with my 
variables. A logit model, or logistic regression, analyzes a dependent binary variable’s 
relationship with a set of independent variables. In this case, the binary variable is BRI 
membership, yes or no, and this was tested against the other factors mentioned above. 
The results of the logit model that was run can be seen in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 Charles Boehmer and Timothy Nordstrom, “Intergovernmental Organization Memberships: Examining 
Political Community and the Attributes of International Organizations,” International Interactions 34, no. 3 
(November 26, 2008): 282–309. 
41 Chin and He 
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Table 2. Estimate of the relation of each variable to a nation’s likelihood of BRI participation. Standard 
deviation is shown below the estimate in parentheses. 
Variable 
 
Estimate 
(Standard Error) 
Model 2 Estimate 
(Standard Error) 
(Intercept) 2.354 
(5.315) 
2.095 
(5.320) 
U.S. Aid -0.000  
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Other Aid (Japan + EU + 
UK) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
US Affinity  0.297  
(6.140) 
0.492 
(6.124) 
China Affinity -2.879 
(5.326) 
-2.614 
(5.330) 
Chinese Projects 0.001 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
GDP per capita -0.052 ** 
(0.018) 
-0.056 ** 
(0.021) 
National GDP -0.001 * 
(0.000) 
-0.001 * 
(0.000) 
AIIB Signatory 1.973 ** 
(0.603) 
1.953 ** 
(0.607) 
Border China 0.250 
(1.007) 
0.326 
(1.026) 
Capital distance (km) -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
HIBE NA 0.415 
(0.844) 
* significant at p < 0.05; ** significant at p < 0.01; *** significant at p < 0.001      
 
     Through this model, I found that the likelihood of a nation joining the BRI was not 
significantly affected by aid competition. This means a nation obtaining more or less 
annual aid from the U.S., EU, UK, or Japan has no impact on that nation’s likelihood of 
being a BRI member. This result is an important finding because it goes against my 
prediction, and that of others, that nations may be turning to China and the BRI in order 
to increase aid flows to their country, and particularly to fill aid gaps left by the U.S. in 
the years since 2008. My model shows that this expectation is not supported and that a 
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nation’s aid inflows from other countries likely has little impact on their decision to join 
the BRI, meaning other factors are more important in that decision.  
     The model also showed that membership likelihood was not impacted by UN affinity 
scores with China or the U.S. This means that a nation’s decision to join the BRI is not 
driven by their diplomatic alignment with China. Due to the strong U.S. criticism toward 
the BRI, it was expected that nations which vote with the U.S. may share these views and 
be less likely join, and that nations which vote with China more often may be more likely 
to join. This model shows that this is not the case. 
     Based on this model, the number of Chinese projects in a nation also does not have a 
significant correlation with their likelihood to join the BRI. This is an important finding 
because it indicates that pre-BRI Chinese involvement in the nation does not play a 
significant role in a nation’s likelihood to become a member. It was suspected that 
nations which already had Chinese projects underway within their borders would be more 
likely to join. Instead, when controlling for other factors, the model showed is not an 
important variable.   
     What the model did show as a statistically significant predictor of BRI membership is 
national GDP (see Figure 1). GDP per capita was similarly found to be a statistically 
significant predictor (see Figure 2). These each have a negative correlation with BRI 
membership likelihood. This means that the lower a nation’s GDP or GDP per capita is, 
the higher the likelihood is of them participating in the BRI. This finding is in line with 
my predictions and provides an important understanding of why many nations are 
choosing to participate in the BRI. Based on this finding, it appears many nations join the 
BRI in an effort to strengthen their economy and increase income through infrastructure 
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investment and development. As discussed in the predictions section above, infrastructure 
investment is a proven way for a nation to increase their GDP and GDP per capita, thus 
this result is consistent with what would be expected for low income nations.    
     Additionally, the model showed a highly significant relationship between a nation 
being an AIIB signatory and being a BRI member (see Figures 1 and 2). A nation which 
is already an AIIB signatory is more likely to join the BRI than a nation which is not part 
of the AIIB. This indicates that nations which already participate in Chinese 
organizations have a higher likelihood of joining the initiative. This is in line with my 
prediction about the relationship of this variable to BRI membership. This result points to 
the existence of a bloc of nations that would be expected to follow China. Those which 
cooperate with China in one arena or on one initiative are more likely to cooperate again 
in the future.  
 
 24 
 
Figure 1. The likelihood of a nation joining the BRI compared to their national GDP. A higher GDP 
correlates with a lower likelihood of BRI membership. 
  
 
Figure 2. The likelihood of a nation joining the BRI compared to their GDP per capita. A higher GDP per 
capita correlates with a lower likelihood of BRI membership. 
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     However, my model indicated that this likelihood to participate was not significantly 
impacted by a nation being geographically close to China or being a bordering nation. 
This is not in line with my predictions. It was suspected that nations geographically close 
to China would be more likely to join the BRI because it is easier to do business with and 
trade with nearby nations. Additionally, they may share similar hopes for increased 
regional connectivity. Nevertheless, despite many nearby nations being BRI members, 
my model showed the geographic proximity of these nations was not a significant factor 
in why they joined. 
     In conclusion, the primary factors that were found to be significant in affecting a 
nation’s likelihood to be a BRI member were national GDP, GDP per capita, and whether 
they were already an AIIB signatory. GDP and GDP per capita were found to have a 
negative relationship with BRI membership: as GDP or GDP per capita goes up, the 
likelihood of joining goes down. When controlling for everything else, a nation which is 
an AIIB signatory was more likely to join than a nation which is not. All other variables 
tested were not found to be statistically significant in determining whether a nation would 
be a BRI member.  
     As an additional robustness check, I also created a dummy variable for high income 
big economies (HIBE), where both GDP per capita and GDP were in the third quartile 
and controlled for this factor in the second model. This model found that the statistical 
correlation of BRI participation to GDP, GDP per capita, and AIIB membership was not 
impacted by the removal of HIBE nations from the analysis.    
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Kazakhstan Statistical Analysis 
     Kazakhstan’s BRI membership, the first case study of this paper, can also be 
examined within the context of the statistical analysis. Figure 3 and Figure 4 indicate 
where Kazakhstan was located in 2013, the year they joined the BRI, along the trend 
lines of likelihood to join versus national GDP and GDP per capita, respectively. Looking 
only at national GDP, Kazakhstan would not have a high likelihood of BRI participation 
as their GDP at the time of joining fell at a very low likelihood mark along the trend line 
(approximately 0.1 probability). Kazakhstan’s 2013 GDP per capita, though, does fall 
along the trend line at a point of high likelihood of joining (approximately 0.7 
probability). Considering only their national GDP, Kazakhstan would not be expected to 
readily join the initiative as they are a richer nation. However, their GDP per capita tells a 
different story and highlights a possible reason for Kazakhstan’s BRI membership. 
Additionally, Kazakhstan is an AIIB signatory, increasing their likelihood of 
participation. Looking at this data, and all three significant factors, Kazakhstan’s BRI 
membership is in line with what would be expected based on the statistical analysis.   
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Figure 3. Kazakhstan’s national GDP in 2013, the year they joined the BRI, and where that falls along the 
trend line of GDP correlation to BRI membership likelihood. 
 
Figure 4. Kazakhstan’s GDP per capita in 2013, the year they joined the BRI, and where that falls along 
the trend line of GDP per capita correlation to BRI membership likelihood. 
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Italy Statistical Analysis 
     Analyzing Italy’s BRI membership in the context of the statistical analysis reveals that 
Italy does not match the expectations for membership for a country of its wealth. Figure 5 
and Figure 6 show where Italy’s GDP and GDP per capita, respectively, in 2018 fell along 
the trend lines that were established by the statistical analysis. Looking at this data, Italy 
would not have a high likelihood of joining the BRI. They are an AIIB member, which 
increases likelihood of joining, but their national GDP is very high, making their likelihood 
to join based on that factor very low (near 0). Italy’s GDP per capita in 2018 fell higher up 
the trend line, but still indicate a below 50% likelihood of participation in the BRI. This 
makes Italy a particularly interesting case for a BRI membership analysis, because they went 
against the expectation for their country, and that is also why it is important to understand the 
Italian government’s reasoning behind joining the initiative.  
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Figure 5. Italy’s national GDP in 2018 and where in falls along the trend line of national GDP’s 
correlation with likelihood to join the BRI. 
 
 
Figure 6. Italy’s GDP per capita in 2018 and where it falls along the trend line of GDP per capita’s 
correlation with likelihood to join the BRI. 
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CHAPTER III 
KAZAKHSTAN CASE STUDY 
Case Study Introduction 
     On September 7, 2013, during a visit to Astana, Kazakhstan, President Xi Jinping 
announced the launch of the overland segment of the BRI; the Silk Road Economic Belt. 
This was the first public mention of the BRI and made Kazakhstan the first official 
member of the project. Since then, Kazakhstan has been a key component of the BRI, 
fully cooperating with China and acting as a connector between China, Russia, and 
Europe. This centrality is the reason I have chosen Kazakhstan as the first of my two case 
studies. This nation stands in stark comparison to my other case study, Italy. Kazakhstan 
was the first nation to join the BRI, borders China and maintains a long history of 
cooperation with China before the BRI. There are now over six years of BRI participation 
to examine. Comparing Kazakhstan’s BRI participation to Italy’s will give an idea of the 
role a neighboring nation plays in the BRI, what it means to be an original member, and 
what the BRI looks like in a nation that has been a member for several years. 
Additionally, studying Kazakhstan will provide an example for what nearby countries 
may hope to gain from China’s initiative, as well as allows for the opportunity to see if 
the national BRI participation indicators, identified in the statistical analysis chapter, hold 
true for a nation that borders China and was an early member. 
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Before the BRI 
     In discussing Kazakhstan’s BRI relationship with China, it is important to first 
recognize that Kazakhstan has a long-standing partnership with China that existed long 
before the initiative. This existing cooperation is likely a key reason that President Xi 
chose Kazakhstan as the location to make his initial BRI announcement and why 
Kazakhstan so readily joined the initiative.42 President Xi recognized that not only does 
Kazakhstan play an important role in achieving the connectivity goals of the BRI, but 
also saw that the Kazakh government was very open to the initiative. Thus, announcing 
the project in Astana would limit national criticism and provide an example of willing 
and eager participation. For Kazakhstan, the BRI was intended to strengthen the pre-
existing ties between the two nations and provide a framework for future infrastructure 
projects and cooperation. They hope the context of the BRI will further their goals of 
becoming a transport hub between Asia and Europe, which will help further develop their 
own infrastructure and economy, increase their national independence, and improve their 
global image. Before going further into Kazakhstan’s BRI membership, I will first 
examine some of the ways Kazakhstan already maintained a steady cooperation with 
China. 
     Kazakhstan has worked closely with China since the nation gained its independence 
after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This cooperation is, in large part, due to the 
proximity of the two nations, but also as a result of Kazakh leaders’ desire to become a 
link between Asia and Europe. When the Soviet Union fell, China quickly began seeking 
 
42 Chris Wright, “Kazakhstan Belt and Road Initiative: The Road to Somewhere,” Euromoney; London, 
May 9, 2018. 
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to build relations with the now former-Soviet nations at its borders, including 
Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan responded rapidly and announced its support of China (rather 
than Taiwan) and the “One China” principle in January 1992, which prompted China to 
open official diplomatic relations between the two nations.43 
     Over the next few years, the two nations worked to establish the bounds of their 
relationship. They signed treaties to resolve issues such as border disputes, made 
agreements to work together against threats such as terrorism and separatism, and began 
pursuing “the benefits of geographical proximity and economic complementarity.”44 
Kazakhstan is rich in oil and mineral resources of which China needed large amounts to 
fuel the rapidly industrializing nation. Likewise, Kazakhstan required consumer goods 
and wished to become more independent from Russia so was eager to establish a trade 
relationship with China. It was in these early years, in 1994, that the two countries began 
talks of creating a “New Silk Road” to promote trade between the nations.45   
     Throughout these years, and the years to come, China and Kazakhstan continued to 
work together to promote friendly relations and economic ties and began undertaking 
various infrastructure projects to connect the two states. The first railway built between 
China and Kazakhstan was in 1991 and a second, more complex, link was built in 2012.46 
The Western Europe-Western China Highway is an infrastructure project that was 
designed to connect China with St. Petersburg, Russia through Kazakhstan. This project 
was initiated in 2008 and the Kazakhstan and China portions were completed by 2016.47 
 
43 Zhenis Kembayev, “Development of China–Kazakhstan Cooperation,” Problems of Post-Communism, 
December 13, 2018, 1–13.  
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Nargis Kassenova, “China’s Silk Road and Kazakhstan’s Bright Path: Linking Dreams of Prosperity,” 
Asia Policy 24, no. 1 (2017): 110–16. 
47 Ibid. 
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Construction of the Russian section of the highway was slow to start, but in July of 2019 
the Russian government approved the development of their section which will complete 
the connection to St. Petersburg and on into Belarus.48 In 1997, the first major oil trade 
deal was made between the two nations. This deal included the construction of a pipeline 
between the two nations. Kazakhstan soon became a supplier of crude oil to China, the 
mutual trade of which reached 1.5 billion USD by 2000.49 Another major natural gas 
pipeline, the Central Asia-China gas pipeline was agreed upon between Kazakhstan and 
China in 2009 and has been expanding ever since, now including Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. This pipeline accounts for half of China’s natural gas imports.50 
     Throughout the early 2000s, cooperation and trade between China and Kazakhstan 
continued to grow and develop. This trade included continuing mention of a new Silk 
Road between the two states; in 1999, Kazakhstan and China released a joint declaration 
announcing their efforts to increase economic cooperation by developing the New Silk 
Road.51 China helped Kazakhstan after the 2008 financial crisis by loaning the nation 10 
billion USD to support them when oil prices fell. China gave $5 billion to the 
Development Bank of Kazakhstan and another $5 billion came from a Chinese, state-run 
oil company, CNPC, and went to their Kazakh partner, KazMunaiGas. A deal was also 
signed giving CNPC the majority shares in a Kazakh oil producing company, 
MangistauMunaiGas.52 Due to the continued strong relations between these two nations, 
 
48 Wade Shepard, “Silk Road Breakthrough: Russia To Begin Construction On The China-Western Europe 
Transport Corridor,” Forbes, July 23, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2019/07/23/silk-
road-breakthrough-russia-to-begin-construction-on-the-china-western-europe-transport-corridor/. 
49 Kembayev 
50 Kassenova 
51 Kembayev 
52 “China Lends Crisis-Hit Kazakhstan $10 Bln,” Reuters, April 16, 2009, 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/china-kazakhstan-loans-idUKLG94896920090416. 
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it comes as no surprise that President Xi Jinping decided to announce his plans for the 
BRI in Astana, Kazakhstan in 2013. President Xi said during the announcement that the 
relationship between the two nations is “an example of neighborliness and mutually 
beneficial cooperation.”53 In other words, the Chinese relationship with Kazakhstan is 
long-standing and represents the increase in cooperation and connectivity President Xi 
hopes to achieve across Eurasia with the BRI. By announcing the BRI here, President Xi 
was able to show an example of an important and eager BRI participant, while the long-
standing history between the two nations helped ensure that the announcement would be 
met with limited criticism.  
 
The BRI Era in Kazakhstan 
     It has now been nearly seven years since President Xi Jinping announced the 
commencement of the BRI in Astana, Kazakhstan. Over the course of that time, the two 
nations have seen ever-growing economic cooperation through increased trade and 
infrastructure projects.  While a strong relationship was already developing between the 
two nations, the BRI has given the context to build a much strong alliance between 
Kazakhstan and China. Trade between the two nations has steadily increased since 2013. 
Russia has always been the top source of Kazakhstan’s imports, but over the last two 
decades China has jumped from Kazakhstan’s eighth largest import amounts to second, 
accounting for nearly 4.7 million USD in imports in 2017 (Russian imports totaled over 
11.4 million USD that year). The largest imports from China to Kazakhstan are iron and 
steel, telecommunications equipment, and industrial and office machinery. Similarly, 
 
53 Ibid. 
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exports to China from Kazakhstan jumped over the last two decades from the fifth largest 
exporter to the second largest position, with over 5.7 million USD in exports to China in 
2017 (Italy, at number one, accounted for over 8.6 million USD in exports from 
Kazakhstan that year). These exports to China have been, largely, crude petroleum oils, 
with an increase in copper and other mineral exports in recent years.54 Additionally, the 
Chinese embassy in Astana reports that China has provided Kazakhstan with over 50 
million USD in loans to date.55  
     Of particular note is Kazakhstan’s eagerness to incorporate the BRI into their nation as 
much as possible, as evidenced by the linking of the BRI with Kazakhstan’s Nurly Zhol, 
or the Bright Road, plan. This is a program that was announced by Kazakhstan’s 
president in November 2014 and initiated in April 2015. The plan’s goal was to revitalize 
the nation’s economy through the construction of infrastructure between 2015 and 2019. 
This revitalization was desperately needed in Kazakhstan after oil prices began declining 
in 2014. In his national address announcing the plan, President Nazarbayev discussed the 
slow economic growth since the 2008 financial crisis and the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank projections of a downturn in the global economy in the years 
following 2014. Along with this general trend, he said their government was facing issues 
with a “drop in prices of [their] export raw materials [which had] led to the reduction of 
the flow of money to [their] income.”56 Nazarbayev stated that in order “to prevent 
negative trends” within Kazakhstan, they must change their economic policies, and that 
 
 54 “UN Comtrade Analytics – Trade Dashboard.” United Nations. United Nations, n.d. 
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was the purpose of the Nurly Zhol program.57 However, soon after the Nurly Zhol 
program was announced, the Kazakh president met with President Xi and they announced 
that Kazakhstan’s program and the BRI were to be linked into a single, cooperative 
project to rebuild the nation. Kazakhstan sees the BRI as a method of gaining capital 
inflows into their country, along with technology and other investments, loans, and aid, to 
help ensure that Nurly Zhol truly gets the country back on its feet. A joint declaration 
declaring the joining of the two initiatives was signed in August 2015 and a plan was 
established and signed by September 2016.58 
         Through the now-combined efforts of Nurly Zhol and the BRI, multiple 
infrastructure projects, mainly surrounding transportation, have been undertaken or 
reinvigorated in Kazakhstan. There are three major, broad projects that are included in 
the combined initiatives. These are the construction and enhancement of railways, the 
building of logistic hubs, and continued production of the West Europe-West China 
highway. There are multiple aspects of these plans that already existed before the BRI 
and Nurly Zhol, but the new initiative allows for continued investment and zeal to be put 
into these projects.59 
     One particularly important project that is often emphasized in studies of China-
Kazakhstan infrastructure cooperation is the special economic zone (SEZ) known as 
Khorgos-Eastern Gate located in the China-Kazakhstan border city of Khorgos. This 
project is a large-scale rail port that was built on the Kazakhstan side of the border. This 
container port is needed at this location because the rail gauge is different in China than 
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in the former Soviet states, so the transition between the two rails happens in Khorgos. 
Additionally, twin cities of the same name have been built up from nearly nothing on 
either side of the border.60 
     There are a couple factors that make the port and cities of Khorgos especially 
important for a study into the BRI relationship between Kazakhstan and China. First, it is 
an astounding example of the rapid infrastructure construction that has been occurring 
under the BRI. The port and two cities sprung up from very little in only the last few 
years, with pictures from as recently as 2014 showing little more than desert in that 
location. Additionally, Khorgos is approximately 1,500 miles from the sea, very near the 
Continental Pole of Inaccessibility, the farthest point on the continent from the sea, 
making it an even more impressive feat. The Khorgos port is also unique because it is 
considered a part of the BRI, but was funded entirely by Kazakhstan, not by China. This 
exemplifies the cooperation that is present in the relationship between the two states and 
how both desire for the BRI’s success. However, it is also very different from other 
nations that are BRI members who require large loans and investment from China to 
conduct infrastructure projects.61 Finally, the area of Khorgos is considered by China and 
Kazakhstan to be an International Centre of Boundary Cooperation. This means that 
Kazakhs and Chinese can pass over the border within this area without a visa or passport, 
and foreigners can pass over the border into the neighboring city with only a passport and 
no visa. This further highlights the cooperation between these two states under the BRI.62 
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     The years since the announcement of the BRI by President Xi have seen increasing 
cooperation and communication between Kazakhstan and China. Trade between the two 
nations is continually on the rise. The linking-up of the BRI and Nurly Zhol highlights the 
eagerness of both nations to continue their collaboration under this new, ambitious 
initiative. The Khorgos-Eastern Gate provides a prime example of some of the large-scale 
projects that are arising out of this collaboration. The BRI era in Kazakhstan has truly 
shaped the nation and its relationship with China and will likely continue to do so in the 
future. 
 
Criticisms within Kazakhstan 
     Despite the perceived benefits to Kazakhstan, there has been a lot of criticism and 
concern about the country’s relationship with China. Specifically, many citizens and 
landowners of Kazakhstan worry about Chinese intentions in the region and the lack of 
transparency coming from the Kazakh government concerning China. Some within 
Kazakhstan fear that there will be a large-scale migration of Chinese people into the 
country who will then take their jobs and land. There have been a number of protests 
surrounding these concerns. A notable case was in April 2016 when many Kazakhs 
protested against a proposed land reform that would allow foreigners to rent land in 
Kazakhstan for 25 years. This protest saw 1,000-2,000 people take to the streets in each 
of the three cities where demonstrations occurred (Atyrau, Aktobe, and Semey). Kazakhs 
were worried that this reform, if passed, would allow Chinese investors to buy out their 
land.63 
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     Many of the fears about the BRI and China among Kazakhstan’s population surround 
Chinese influx into the nation’s agricultural businesses. The Kazakh government has, to 
an extent, recognized these fears, particularly after the 2016 protests, and made efforts to 
revise the Chinese agriculture cooperation reforms to assuage Kazakh citizens. First, the 
government tabled the law that had caused the 2016 protests. Then, in May of 2016, the 
government announced that Chinese investors and companies would not be allowed to 
buy Kazakh lands and instead could only jointly invest in Kazakh agricultural goods and 
companies.64 Nevertheless, while this eased some tensions within Kazakhstan, fears still 
persist. Many still see the government as not properly addressing their concerns, 
believing that “the high corruption component of Kazakh–Chinese relations cannot be 
denied,” and that Kazakhstan represents “a kind of ultimate China lobby.”65 
 
Kazakh Motivations/Reasoning for BRI Membership 
     Even though Kazakhstan’s BRI membership is in line with the prediction of the 
statistical analyses that was discussed above, it is still necessary to further examine their 
motivations for joining to better understand what they hope to achieve from membership 
in the initiative. Kazakhstan has long stated that their primary goal for the BRI is to make 
their nation the link between China and the rest of Eurasia. The Kazakh President, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, who served from their independence in 1990 until 2019, 
discussed reviving the ancient Silk Road even before President Xi came to power in 
China and announced the BRI. In May 2012, Nazarbayev stated at the end of a meeting 
with the Kazakhstan Foreign Investors’ Council, “Today I want to propose to jointly 
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launch the large-scale project, the ‘New Silk Road’. Kazakhstan must revive its historic 
role and become the largest business and transit hub of the Central Asian region as well 
as a unique bridge between Europe and Asia.”66  
     Kazakhstan’s desire to be a link between Europe and Asia arises from a desire to 
develop their own nation. The Kazakh government hopes that if they make Kazakhstan a 
transportation hub connecting Europe and Asia it will, in turn, develop the infrastructure 
of the entire nation, particularly transportation and communication infrastructure. This is 
difficult for them to do without Chinese assistance and the boost in capital flow passing 
through their nation with the help of the BRI.67 In 2015, Kazakhstan’s foreign minister 
wrote an article discussing Kazakhstan’s independent push for development within their 
nation, saying they are not simply a bystander in the region. In this article, the minister 
wrote that part of the Kazakh motivation in becoming a link between Asia and Europe 
was that the roads and railways would “not only serve just as transit ‘conduits’ between 
east and west, north and south but will come as life-lines for local communities all along 
the way in terms of creating and boosting local markets, empowering local businesses 
and private sectors, thus promoting well-being and prosperity, peace and stability in the 
entire area.”68  
     This Kazakh desire can be seen by looking at the linking-up of the BRI and Nurly 
Zhol, as discussed above. China and Kazakhstan both have the same goal of using 
Kazakhstan to connect Europe and Asia, and their different reasons behind this goal are 
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exemplified in this link of Nurly Zhol and the BRI. China wishes to use Kazakhstan as a 
connection with Europe because it allows them easier access to their trading partners in 
the west and a faster route, particularly with rail transportation, to get their goods to other 
Eurasian markets. Connecting the BRI with Nurly Zhol allows them to further advance 
Kazakhstan’s infrastructure and more quickly and easily connect China with Europe. As 
for Kazakhstan, connecting their domestic project with the BRI and hastening the 
creation of their nation as a link between Europe and Asia helps boost their domestic 
infrastructure and economy. By having China help Nurly Zhol succeed, Kazakhstan gets a 
much-needed boost in their transportation infrastructure which will boost their own 
economy.69  
     Kazakh officials have repeatedly emphasized this point that the goals of Nurly Zhol 
and the BRI are similar in nature and mutually beneficial. The Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Roman Vassilenko, stated in 2017 that “Nurly Zhol is 
designed to turn Kazakhstan into a key Eurasian transport and logistics hub, connecting 
the North, South, West and East,” and went on the say that this goal is shared by China 
through the BRI.70 Similarly, Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Singapore, Usen Suleimen, 
said in 2018 that President Xi announcing the BRI in Kazakhstan showed from the 
beginning that “Kazakhstan would play a major role in the implementation of this 
megaproject. This, in turn, coincides with the strategic objectives of Kazakhstan on great 
modernisation [sic] and transformation into a regional transport and logistics hub, 
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connecting Europe and Asia.”71 Suleiman went on to discuss Nurly Zhol, reiterating that 
this project shares the goals of the BRI and that is why Kazakh leaders believe that the 
linking of the two projects would be beneficial. 
     Nurly Zhol is just one aspect, however, of a much larger plan for revitalizing 
Kazakhstan, the Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy, which former President Nazarbayev 
announced in 2012. This is a comprehensive strategy that details plans for the 
development of the nation over the next few decades. In 2014, Kazakhstan’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs discussed this project while speaking in Washington, D.C., saying, “At 
its heart is the ambition for our nation to become one of the world’s 30 most developed 
countries by 2050.”72 This strategy also includes other aspects beyond infrastructure and 
economic development. As part of the Third Modernization of Kazakhstan, one part of 
the strategy which was announced by former President Nazarbayev in 2017, there are 
plans for initiatives such as continuing the switch of the Kazakh language away from the 
Kazakh-Cyrillic alphabet to the Latin alphabet, revitalizing national education standards, 
and increasing protections for national holy sites. In Nazarbayev’s speech announcing the 
commencement of the Third Modernization, he at one point stated, “For the first time our 
culture will be known in all continents and in all main languages.”73 Joining the BRI, 
becoming a major transport hub for Eurasia, can help Kazakhstan achieve these goals. 
Being a major waypoint along the new Silk Road will not only help promote the 
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development of their economy and infrastructure but will also contribute to the spreading 
of Kazakh culture and their increased presence on the world stage.   
     The best physical example highlighting this Kazakh motivation for participating in the 
BRI can be seen by once again looking at the Khorgos-Eastern Gate. This port is located 
five days by train from Eastern China and approximately nine to ten days from Europe. 
This means the port is perfect for shipping goods between China and Europe, as well as 
anywhere else on the Eurasian continent. A chief operating officer of the gate, Hicham 
Belmaachi, told a Euromoney reporter, “When you clear goods here in Khorgos they can 
go anywhere: to Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia,” and this is without having to go 
through customs again.74 This port is the epitome of what Kazakhstan wanted to gain 
from the BRI. They want to be a connection point between China and the rest of Eurasia. 
With this port, they are getting to be just that and, in turn, improving their own 
infrastructure and economy. 
     Another major motivation for Kazakhstan to work with China, both during and before 
the BRI era, is to further their independence from Russia, which has been a goal of 
Kazakhstan since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. As Kazakhstan is a former Soviet 
state, Russia has remained one of their primary trading partners for the last couple of 
decades. Before forming the new relationships with China, there already existed a 
number of railways connecting Kazakhstan and China. By participating in the BRI, 
connecting it with Nurly Zhol, and making themselves a regional transportation hub, 
Kazakhstan hopes to develop its connections with the rest of the world and open up trade 
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with more international markets.75 The infrastructure built for the BRI will benefit them 
in this way and will further improve their economy and independence. 
     By looking at Kazakhstan’s trade statistics, it can be seen that this goal of lessening 
Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on Russia has been working, both before the official 
BRI announcement and increasingly so since 2013. Examining both imports and exports, 
a general trend away from dependence on Russia can be seen. For exports from 
Kazakhstan, Russia was the leading country of origin from Kazakhstan until 2002 (when 
Bermuda took the number one export spot), but even after that remained on the top of the 
list. By 2010, Russia had dropped to fifth on the export list, with China and Italy as the 
top two. Since 2013 and the commencement of the BRI, Russia has remained in the 
fourth or fifth spot, but with a trend of a lower percentage of total exports each year, with 
China and Italy remaining at the top. For imports, Russia has continually remained the 
primary source of goods for Kazakhstan, but with an increasing role of China and other 
nations. For Kazakhstan’s first couple decades as an independent nation, Russian imports 
accounting for a vast percentage of their total imports. However, by 2010, China had 
quickly slid up to the second position and was lessening Kazakhstan’s near total reliance 
on Russia. While the amounts vary each year, since the BRI announcement, China 
continued to stay in the second position, accounting for an increased percentage of 
imports to Kazakhstan.76  
     Overall, Kazakhstan’s major goal for participating in the BRI is to become a trade and 
transportation connection between China/Asia and Europe. By becoming this link, 
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Kazakhstan can advance their domestic infrastructure, build up their economy, and work 
toward their goals of the Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy. They can become a hub of trade in 
the region, promoting their economy and regional and global status. This also allows 
them to further their independence from Russia and further open up their economy to 
other international markets, as well as promote their independent culture and language 
worldwide. Altogether, Kazakhstan hopes the BRI will help their nation become stronger 
through increased infrastructure, trade, and regional and global recognition. 
 
Kazakhstan Conclusions 
     This analysis of Kazakhstan’s BRI relationship with China has shown that 
Kazakhstan’s primary goal is to improve their economy, infrastructure, and regional and 
global standing. They wish to improve their trade with China and the rest of Eurasia and 
the world, as well as further develop their nation through the benefits that will be gained 
from being a major international transport hub. The BRI can help Kazakhstan meet those 
goals, particularly after linking the BRI with their own domestic project, Nurly Zhol. 
Standing between China and Russia and Europe, making them an important aspect of 
improving connectivity in the region, China had strong interests in improving the 
relationship between the two nations so Kazakhstan can be used to more quickly 
transport Chinese goods to European markets. Kazakhstan saw this Chinese benefit and 
utilized it by pushing for the revitalization of the ancient Silk Road and eagerly 
participating once President Xi announced the BRI.  
     Over six years later, the results can already be seen. Kazakhstan and Chinese trade 
have improved. Kazakhstan’s infrastructure has seen massive development, as evidenced 
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by the Khorgos-Eastern Gate and the growth of the city around it (with plans for another 
nearby city to be built soon).77 New pipelines have been built connecting China with 
Kazakhstan, which has both benefited China’s ever-growing energy needs and helped 
Kazakhstan improve their energy infrastructure to more easily transport gas and oil from 
the western parts of the country to population centers elsewhere in Kazakhstan.78 
Kazakhstan is well on its way to meeting its goal of using the BRI to become a link 
between Europe and Asia and, in so doing, improve their domestic infrastructure, their 
economy, and global image by standing as a major waypoint between China and the rest 
of Eurasia.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 Wright 
78 Kassenova 
 47 
CHAPTER IV 
ITALY CASE STUDY 
Case Study Introduction 
     China and Italy signed an MoU on March 23, 2019 during President Xi Jinping’s 
official state visit to Rome. In signing this MoU, the Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe 
Conte, officially announced that Italy would become an official member of the BRI. This 
was a landmark announcement as Italy had become the first of the G7, and largest 
European economy, to join the BRI. They are also the first founding member of the 
European Union to form this relationship with China. In signing, Italy went against the 
views held by the rest of the G7 and their western European allies, and the United States. 
These other nations all still maintain a high level of skepticism surrounding the BRI, 
particularly the US. Italy, however, was optimistic for the benefits they may gain to their 
economy.79 The goal of this case study is to examine why Italy may have joined the BRI, 
despite not being a historical Chinese partner and the reluctance of the rest of western 
Europe and the G7. I will also examine what this relationship looks like so far in the year 
following the announcement. Particularly, what does a BRI membership mean for a 
nation such as Italy, which does not border China or have a long-standing relationship, as 
opposed to a nation such as Kazakhstan? 
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Before the BRI 
     Unlike Kazakhstan, Italy was not a major trading partner with China in the years 
leading up to the BRI and their participation in the initiative. Italy’s economic 
relationship with China pales to that of other EU and G7 states. In recent years, China has 
invested approximately eight times the amount into Germany that was invested in Italy. 
They are not, historically, close trading partners. In 2018, Italian trade with China was 
valued at around 13 billion euros (a little over 14.1 billion USD). In Germany, Chinese 
trade was valued at 94 billion euros (over 102.5 billion USD). Even shipping routes 
between China and Europe are more easily connected to Spain and Belgium than to 
Italy.80 
     What China and Italy do share as an important historical relationship is the ancient 
Silk Road. During the era of antiquity when the ancient Silk Road flourished (c. 130 BCE 
until 1453 CE), this famous trade route connected China with Venice and the Roman 
Empire. The Silk Road allowed for the transfer of goods, people, ideas, and culture from 
Rome and Italy across the Middle East and Asia into China, and vice versa. In the 13th 
century, Venetian explorer Marco Polo traveled from Italy across Asia and into China, 
writing an account of his travels that inspired explorers for centuries. President Xi even 
told students at an Italian school on March 18, 2019 to “become modern-day Marco 
Polos, as cultural ambassadors between Italy and China in this new era.”81 
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BRI Era in Italy 
     When Italy officially joined the BRI on March 23, 2019, two sets of agreements were 
made between the two nations. The first was the official agreement for Italy to join the 
BRI which made blanket statements about the nature of the new relationship between 
China and Italy. The “areas of cooperation” which were identified within the MoU that 
was signed by the leaders of the two nations are: policy dialogue, transport, logistics, and 
infrastructure, unimpeded trade and investment, financial cooperation, people-to-people 
connectivity, and green development cooperation.82 These agreements stated that China 
and Italy agreed to improve connectivity and communication between their two nations 
under the framework of the BRI and the AIIB. Under the category of infrastructure 
development, the MoU states, “The Parties will cooperate in the development of 
infrastructure connectivity, including financing, interoperability and logistics, in areas of 
mutual interest (such as roads, railways, bridges, civil aviation, ports, energy – including 
renewables and natural gas - and telecommunications).”83 
     Beyond the umbrella agreement, Chinese investors also signed a number of deals of 
more specific projects. These twenty-nine agreements came to a total of 2.8 billion USD. 
These projects included investment into the further development of ports in Trieste, 
Genoa, and Palermo.84 Ministers also signed agreements concerning energy, finance, and 
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agriculture. Italian gas and energy and engineering firms signed further deals, with China 
offering the Italian companies access into Chinese markets.85    
     With only a year passing since these agreements were formed, there is little 
information on the progress that has resulted from these agreements. This is likely due to 
rising conflicts of interest between Italy and China since the deals were signed. The 
conflict seems to be arising due to two factors: Italy’s membership in the EU and G7 and 
disagreements on importance of various infrastructure development locations within 
Italy. In July of 2019, Prime Minister Conte said in a statement, “The Chinese initiative 
must…develop in an open and inclusive way, respecting the standards and principles 
enshrined in the EU strategy.”86 To many onlookers, it appeared the Italian government’s 
enthusiasm about participation in the BRI had reduced drastically since March. The 
Prime Minister also said in his statement that regional projects within the EU were 
“equally valid,” further hinting that Conte may have growing concerns about Italy’s 
participation in the BRI.87 
     This growing concern about the BRI relating to Italy’s EU membership can also be 
seen by looking at the Port of Trieste in northeastern Italy. At the beginning of 2020, it 
was announced that Trieste’s port would be receiving 45.5 million euros in development 
funds from the EU, despite deals with China to develop this port. A large part of this 
funding, 39 million euros, is coming from a loan from the European Investment Bank, 
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and the rest is coming from the EU by means of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).88 
The CEF is “a key EU funding instrument to promote growth, jobs and competitiveness 
through targeted infrastructure investment at European level. It supports the development 
of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks 
in the fields of transport, energy and digital services.”89 The EU, and CEF, supporting 
development in the Port of Trieste in this manner highlights Italy’s division between their 
EU membership and their BRI deals with China. 
     The other factor stalling BRI investment in Italy seems to be some disagreement on 
where the investment should be directed. One example of this is a disagreement that has 
sprung up over port investment in Genoa versus Trieste. China wants to invest in Trieste 
and develop the port further themselves. Investing in Trieste would give China access to 
rail systems that reach across Europe, which is particularly important for China’s ability 
to reach landlocked countries. On the other hand, Italy, thinking of their own national 
infrastructure needs, wants China to develop Genoa’s port which they see as a bigger 
priority for Italian interests.90 Disagreements such as these have slowed much of the BRI 
progress in the region. 
       However, there is ultimately not much information or data surrounding Italy’s 
current level of cooperation with China under the BRI. More time needs to pass to 
determine whether Italy and China’s agreements will come to fruition. For now, it seems 
Italy and China are still working to coordinate their investment agreements. The outcry of 
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nations such as France, Germany, and the United States concerning Italy’s participation 
in the BRI has temporarily stalled Italy’s BRI progress while they work to find a balance 
between their EU membership and their BRI commitment.  
 
Italian Motivations/Reasoning for BRI Membership 
     The U.S., Germany, France, and others have continually held their position of being 
cautious about China’s ambitions surrounding the BRI. These nations were critical of 
Italy’s decision to break ranks from their western counterparts and form this new 
relationship with China. Despite this, Italy went ahead and signed the MoU anyway. 
Furthermore, the statistical analysis above revealed that Italy’s membership goes against 
the expectations for a nation of its wealth. The question then arose: What does Italy hope 
to gain from being a member of the BRI, and what is their response to the criticism 
coming from their western allies? 
     Italy had been discussing its ambitions for the BRI for a couple years leading up to 
their official membership agreement. The nation’s officials have repeatedly claimed they 
have high hopes for the BRI to improve Italian infrastructure, particularly their ports, 
promote made-in-Italy products, and improve connectivity across Europe and the 
Mediterranean. In May of 2017, the Italian Prime Minister, then Paolo Gentiloni, traveled 
to Beijing to attend the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (Italy 
attended again at the second forum in 2019). Fifty-seven heads of state were present at 
this forum. Participation in this event indicates high levels of interest in the BRI. A few 
days prior to the event, Gentiloni made a statement saying that Italy was interested in 
joining the BRI. Specifically, he stated that, “Bringing the Chinese economy closer 
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through this gigantic infrastructural operation is enormously interesting to Italy, not only 
for our government but also for our universities and public and private businesses.”91  
     The Italian government has, specifically, continually emphasized their hopes for port 
development through BRI participation. In July 2017, former Italian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Angelino Alfano was asked about the port of Trieste in respect to BRI prospects. 
In response, he said that Italy and China share many common goals to work to develop 
transportation infrastructure as well as digital infrastructure in the region.92 This ambition 
for port infrastructure development was reiterated again twice in October of 2017. The 
Italian Foreign Minister stated at a meeting of the Italian-Arab Business Forum that: 
“Italy’s aim is to relaunch the Mediterranean as a global economic hub, grasping new 
development opportunities such as: doubling the Suez canal, discovering new energy 
sources, and the ambitious ‘new Silk Road’ project, in which Italian ports are the gateway 
to the European market.”93 A few days later, the Italian Prime Minister stated in a 
meeting: “In China we are looking with great interest at the development of the ‘new silk 
road’ and at the potential rebound this will have on Italian ports in terms of expansion.”94 
Clearly, port development is a primary objective for Italy, and indeed was included in the 
agreements signed when Italy officially joined the BRI. 
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     Italy has other ambitions as well for their participation in the BRI. As part of the 
agreements made between Italy and China under the BRI, China agreed to open up 
Chinese markets for more Italian businesses and products. This is clearly important to 
Italy. In November 2019, at the second China International Import Expo, Italian Foreign 
Minister Luigi Di Maio highlighted Italy’s desire to promote ‘Made in Italy’ products and 
increase Italian products’ visibility and reputation in China as well as along the rest of the 
Silk Road.95 The day before the expo, Di Maio met with Chinese State Councillor and 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi and the two discussed increasing the ease of access for Italian 
products entering the Chinese market through the removal of barriers such as tariffs.96  
     It appears that exports of Italian products to the Chinese market have become a 
primary goal of Italy within the BRI. Even the infrastructure projects, that were discussed 
in the early stages of their BRI membership, Italy now sees as largely an opportunity to 
export Italian goods. In November of 2019, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
announced that an agreement over development of the port of Trieste had been signed. In 
an interview, the head of cabinet at the Ministry said, “The agreement with Trieste serves 
to open the way for Italian products to China”.97 It seems that one of the biggest 
motivations for Italy joining the BRI and signing agreements with China is to increase 
Italian exports and open their products up to a wider global market. Since China is such a 
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large economy, being a member of the BRI and gaining access to that market can help 
Italian businesses and improve the Italian economy.  
     Despite continually clarifying their motivations behind joining the BRI, Italy has 
gained a lot of criticism for their decision from their allies such as Germany and the 
United States. Soon after Italy’s decision to join, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas 
criticized Italy in an interview, saying that, “Countries that believe they can do clever 
business with the Chinese will wonder when they suddenly wake up in dependency,” and 
that the EU needs to be united in order to survive and compete against global powers 
such as China.98 The United States, under the Trump administration, has also been highly 
critical of the BRI. The administration lobbied against the decision of Italy to join the 
initiative and have pressured European nations to not sign 5G agreements with China’s 
tech corporation Huawei, a deal which Italy did end up signing with China.99 These 
allies, as well as some Italian citizens and officials, have also criticized the Italian 
government for their decision saying it puts Italian sovereignty at risk.  
     The Italian government has repeatedly responded to these objections saying that it will 
be beneficial for Italy and that they are always careful to ensure agreements made do not 
threaten the nation’s sovereignty. In response to criticism from the U.S. and President 
Trump, the Italian Ambassador to Washington, Armando Varricchio, said in an interview 
that Italy’s reasoning had always been clear and that, “For Italy it is a question of 
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capturing an interesting economic perspective.”100 Italian government officials have 
repeatedly responded to criticisms in this way, stating that they are trying to increase their 
economy and infrastructure. They have also responded to criticism from the EU saying 
that France and Germany, though not BRI members, have much larger economic ties 
with China,101 and that, in looking at large European economies, “Italy is the one that 
suffers most from a negative gap in the trade with China.”102 
     Italy has also faced a lot of criticism saying that they are risking Italian sovereignty 
and that of their allies. In particular, these other nations, especially the U.S., are worried 
about deals surrounding Huawei’s 5G infrastructure, claiming it opens up the possibility 
for Chinese companies to spy and garner intelligence on Italy and other nations. When 
asked about the BRI deal at a press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo, Minister Di Maio stated that they are careful when signing deals to ensure that 
they do not risk Italian sovereignty. In response to the U.S. push against 5G 
infrastructure, he said the Italian government has initiated a decree, the ‘golden power’ 
rules, which lets them “define the cybersecurity framework as far as [their] country is 
concerned.”103 The Italian government is saying they can get the benefits of 5G, and other 
Chinese business deals, without the risk because they are able to control the construction 
of this infrastructure in their nation. Additionally, Italian officials associated with the 
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signing of the MoU have said on multiple occasions, in response to U.S. and European 
objections, that the MoU is not a legally binding contract and thus does not represent a threat 
to Italy, its citizens, or their allies.104 
     In response to questions about going against the position of the EU and G7, Italian 
officials have said they will always ensure their EU priorities come first and that the BRI 
will never hinder their other alliances. At the press conference with U.S. Secretary 
Pompeo, Minister Di Maio said that when signing agreements they “make sure that [they] 
include any possible guarantee so that European legislation is complied with, and so that the 
European principles are complied with, the principles with which [they] regulate [their] trade 
relations with other non-EU countries.”105 Again and again, Italian officials state that their 
other trade alliances are always important, that they share the concerns of the U.S. and other 
European countries, and that they will continue to work with the EU and G7 nations to find 
the best solutions to the issues arising from cooperation with China. Their alliances and 
friendships with the U.S., EU, and NATO countries will always be “essential cornerstones” 
for the Italian government.106  
     In summary, Italy’s primary objectives for joining the BRI seem to be hopes for port 
development and increase the presence of Italian goods in the Chinese and global markets. In 
this way, the Italian government hopes to boost their economy and promote Italian 
businesses. They have faced a lot of criticism for their decision, from European allies and the 
U.S., but have continually responded that the BRI is not a threat to Italy or its allies. They 
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have stated that the hopes surrounding the BRI are to exploit a new economic opportunity to 
promote Italian goods and their economy. 
 
Italy Conclusions 
     The case study into Italy’s membership in the BRI has shown that Italy’s primary goal in 
signing the MoU with China is to increase Italian exports and improve visibility of Italian 
products in foreign markets, particularly in China, through port development. Italy wants to 
improve their port infrastructure so they can increase exports. The development of stronger 
digital communications infrastructure, through Huawei’s 5G, will help Italy with this goal. 
They have faced much criticism from their allies for signing this deal. However, they have 
responded that many of these nations, like Germany, have stronger economic ties with China 
than Italy currently does, just not through the BRI. Additionally, they have said that their 
European friendships, and the U.S., will always be primary alliances and their partnership 
with China is intended to help continue to boost the Italian economy. Finally, they ensure 
their allies that the BRI deal is of no threat to Italy or their allies as the MoU is not legally 
binding and they always make sure there is no threat to Italian sovereignty in the BRI 
agreements by enacting decrees such as the ‘Golden Power’ in relation to 5G infrastructure.  
     A year later, there is not much evidence of action being taken on the agreements that were 
signed in March 2019. Progress has been stalled due to conflicts about Italy’s commitments 
to the EU and G7, as well as conflicts with China about infrastructure priorities within Italy. 
However, Italian officials remain hopeful about the benefits of participating in the BRI. 
Many still argue that it will be beneficial to the Italian economy by boosting Italian 
businesses and increasing exports.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
     Participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative can be generally seen as arising from 
national desires to increase GDP and GDP per capita. Additionally, nations which already 
work with China on other international projects, such as the AIIB, are more likely to 
cooperate with China again as members of the BRI. At its core, the BRI is an infrastructure 
investment initiative designed to increase regional connectivity and bolster the economies of 
participating nations through growth in transportation infrastructure, communications 
infrastructure, and more. Previous studies have shown that an increase in investments toward 
infrastructure production, particularly transportation infrastructure, can be a key element in 
improving a nation’s GDP and GDP per capita. Thus, it comes as no surprise that my 
statistical analysis identified GDP and GDP per capita as having statistically significant 
negative correlations with likelihood of joining the BRI. 
     It was also not surprising that my analysis found nations which were AIIB signatories had 
a higher likelihood of BRI participation. The AIIB is an international investment bank 
created by China to, primarily, fund the BRI. That means many nations that join the AIIB are, 
in many ways, already supporting the BRI. Furthermore, nations which already belong to 
international Chinese initiatives will likely more readily join another, and this is seen with the 
AIIB signatory significant correlation with likelihood to join the BRI.  
     My statistical analysis did not find any significant correlation with BRI membership in 
any of the other factors tested, including foreign aid amounts, FDI inflows, capital distance, 
and affinity scores. These all went against the predictions which I had made for these data 
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sets. This leaves us with the conclusion that, based on my analysis, the primary motivator for 
nations joining the BRI is the promotion of their economy, and that a small and poor 
economy that is an AIIB signatory is more likely to join than a nation which is not a 
signatory. 
     There are a few limitations to my chosen method of analyzing participation that need to be 
addressed. Focusing solely on BRI participation only provides a snapshot view of China’s 
global outreach and ambitions. There are many aspects of China’s worldwide initiatives, 
projects, and investments that are not encompassed by this study. As discussed in the 
statistical analysis chapter, my study found less nations to be BRI participants than previous 
studies identified. This is because many reports include all recent Chinese investments and 
infrastructure projects as part of the BRI. My study, instead, sought to address international 
cooperation that has been clearly identified as BRI participation and has been mutually 
agreed upon by both China and the participator. This then presents the limitation that there 
are many nations which have taken Chinese investments or are sites of Chinese projects 
which are not included in my study because they are not clearly part of the BRI. However, 
my study provides a look at exactly what BRI participation means, and what it does not, and 
what motivates nations to make this mutual agreement to be participants in the initiative. 
     Beyond the general trend of membership motivation based on GDP, GDP per capita, and 
AIIB membership, there are other factors which arise on a case-by-case basis that cause 
nations to join the BRI. In Kazakhstan, the government had been pushing for this initiative 
for years prior to President Xi’s commencement of the BRI. They believe that a revitalization 
of the ancient Silk Road will help Kazakhstan become a transportation hub between China 
and the rest of Eurasia. Through the Chinese investment, the Kazakh government hopes to 
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revitalize their own economy by boosting their transportation and communications 
infrastructure. Furthermore, they hope that the initiative will help spread Kazakh goods and 
culture across the world and rise the nation up to the level of a top global economic power. 
This Kazakh desire is reflected in the context of the statistical analysis findings, which puts 
Kazakhstan at a high likelihood of joining the BRI when considering their GDP and GDP per 
capita at the time of joining. 
     Italy’s membership, on the other hand, does not correspond with the statistical analysis 
results. Their national GDP in 2019, when they joined, puts them at a near zero percent 
likelihood of joining, and their GDP per capita puts them at less than a fifty percent chance. 
However, despite this, their desires to join the BRI are similar to those of Kazakhstan. Italy’s 
government hopes that joining the BRI will improve Italian infrastructure, especially port 
infrastructure, and open up their businesses to new foreign markets. They see the BRI as a 
unique opportunity to gain new investments into their nation and to support Italian goods and 
businesses.  
     While these are just two possible case studies out of the 90 identified members, they 
provide a look at what some nations may hope to achieve by joining the BRI. They show the 
many similarities in the motivations for joining, such as a hope for improved infrastructure 
and access to foreign markets. Italy and Kazakhstan also provide a look into the differences 
between promoting the BRI in an Asian economy with close ties to China versus a European 
economy which has alliances with China’s critics. In Kazakhstan, the BRI has already helped 
the production of large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the Khorgos-Eastern Gate, while 
in Italy advancement with the initiative has been slow due to conflicting commitments of the 
Italian government (their partnership with China versus their commitments to the EU, G7, 
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and NATO). Additionally, these case studies provide a look at some of the criticisms that can 
arise from a nation participating in the BRI. In Kazakhstan, these criticisms arose mostly in 
the form of fear that Chinese businesses would take land from Kazakhs, fears which the 
Kazakh government has attempted, somewhat successfully, to quell. In Italy, many criticisms 
come from their allies: the U.S., EU, and the rest of the G7. The response to these criticisms 
has been to recommit to their responsibilities within the EU and G7 while still looking to 
bolster their economy, while also pointing to nations such as Germany which have much 
higher annual trading amounts with China than Italy does.   
     In conclusion, nations which have a lower GDP and GDP per capita are more likely to 
join the BRI than richer nations. Being an AIIB signatory increases that likelihood even 
more. Countries like Kazakhstan reflect this data, with their government looking to improve 
their economy and increase their standing on the world stage through their BRI membership. 
Nations such as Italy joining is less expected as they have a much higher GDP. Despite that, 
their reasons for joining the BRI are similar to Kazakhstan’s, with a desire to bolster their 
economy and gain greater access to foreign markets, particularly those in China. 
Predominantly, it can be seen that the reason so many nations have joined the BRI, including 
ones that may not have been suspected to do so, is because the initiative is seen as an 
opportunity to gain investments in infrastructure, which is crucial for a nation’s economy, 
and increase their global standing.   
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APPENDIX 
List of Nations Identified as BRI Members 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Brunei  
Bulgaria 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Estonia 
Ethiopia  
Fiji 
Finland 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guyana 
Hungary 
Indonesia 
Israel 
Italy 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Malta 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Nigeria 
North 
Macedonia 
 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Philippines 
Poland 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak 
Republic 
 
Slovenia 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
 
Timor-Leste 
Tonga 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Vietnam 
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BRI Participation Measurements 
 
 
Country Name Year of 1st Project MoU MoU Notes BRI Forum Attendance 2019 BRI Forum Attendance 2017 Claimed by China AIIB Signatory SCO Ancient Silk Road Border China
Afghanistan 2016 Joint Statement 2018 No No 2013 Yes Observer Yes Yes
Angola No No No No No No
Albania 2017 No No 2013 No No No No
Andorra No No No No No No
United Arab Emirates 2018 Oil agreement 2017 Yes No 2013 Yes No Yes No
Argentina No Yes No No No No
Armenia No No 2013? No Dialogue Yes No
Antigua and Barbuda 2018 New MoU in 2019 No No No No No No
Australia 2018 Victoria only No No Yes No No No
Austria 2018 Yes No Yes No No No
Azerbaijan 2015 Yes No 2013 Yes Dialogue Yes No
Burundi No No No No No No
Belgium No No Yes No No No
Benin No No No No No No
Burkina Faso No No No No No No
Bangladesh 2019 No No 2013 Yes No No No
Bulgaria 2015 No No 2013 No No No No
Bahrain 2018 No No 2013 Yes No No No
Bahamas No No No No No No
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2017 No No 2013 No No No No
Belarus Yes Yes 2013 Yes Observer No No
Belize No No No No No No
Bolivia 2018 No No No No No No
Brazil No No Yes No No No
Barbados 2018 No No No No No No
Brunei Darussalam Yes No 2013 Yes No Yes No
Bhutan No No 2013 No No No Yes
Botswana No No No No No No
Central African Republic No No No No No No
Canada No No Yes No No No
Switzerland 2019 Yes Yes Yes No No No
Chile 2018 Yes Yes No No No No
China *** Yes*** Yes*** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Cote d'Ivoire 2018 No No No No No No
Cameroon 2018 No No No No No No
Congo, Dem. Rep. No No No No No No
Congo, Rep. No No No No No No
Colombia No No No No No No
Comoros No No No No No No
Cabo Verde No No No No No No
Costa Rica 2018 No No No No No No
Cuba No No No No No No
Cyprus 2019 Yes No Yes No No No
Czech Republic 2015 Yes Yes 2013 No No No No
Germany No No Yes No Yes No
Djibouti Yes No No No No No
Dominica No No No No No No
Denmark No No Yes No No No
Dominican Republic No No No No No No
Algeria 2018 No No No No No No
Ecuador 2018 No No No No No No
Egypt 2016 Yes No 2013 Yes No No No
Eritrea No No No No No No
Spain No Yes Yes No Yes No
Estonia No No 2013 No No No No
Ethiopia 2018 Yes Yes Yes No No No
Finland 2017 Joint Declaration No No Yes No No No
Fiji 2018 No Yes Yes No No No
France 2018 Joint Declaration No No Yes No No No
Micronesia No No No No No No
Gabon No No No No No No
United Kingdom No No Yes No No No
Georgia No No 2013 Yes No Yes No
Ghana 2018 No No No No No No
Guinea No No Yes No No No
The Gambia No No No No No No
Guinea-Bissau No No No No No No
Equatorial Guinea No No No No No No
Greece 2018 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Grenada 2018 No No No No No No
Guatemala No No No No No No
Guyana 2018 No No No No No No
Honduras No No No No No No
Croatia 2017 No No 2013 No No No No
Haiti No No No No No No
Hungary 2015 Yes Yes 2013 Yes No No No
Indonesia 2015 Joint Declaration Yes ** Yes 2013 Yes No Yes No
India No No 2013 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ireland No No Yes No No No
Iran 2016 No No 2013 Yes Observer Yes No
Iraq No No 2013 No No Yes No
Iceland No No Yes No No No
Israel 2017 No No 2013 Yes No No No
Italy 2019 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Jamaica 2019 No No No No No No
Jordan No No 2013 Yes No Yes No
Japan No No No No Yes No
Kazakhstan 2015 Joint Declaration Yes Yes 2013 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kenya 2014 2018 Yes Yes No No Yes No
Kyrgyzstan Yes Yes 2013 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cambodia Yes Yes 2013 Yes Dialogue Yes No
Kiribati No No No No No No
St. Kitts and Nevis No No No No No No
South Korea No No Yes No Yes No
Kuwait No No 2013 Yes No Yes No
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Country Name Year of 1st Project MoU MoU Notes BRI Forum Attendance 2019 BRI Forum Attendance 2017 Claimed by China AIIB Signatory SCO Ancient Silk Road Border China
Laos 2016 Yes Yes 2013 Yes No No Yes
Lebanon 2017 No No 2013 No No Yes No
Liberia No No No No No No
Libya 2018 No No No No No No
St. Lucia No No No No No No
Liechtenstein No No No No No No
Sri Lanka No Yes 2013 Yes Dialogue Yes No
Lesotho No No No No No No
Lithuania 2017 No No 2013 No No No No
Luxembourg 2019 No No Yes No No No
Latvia 2016 No No 2013 No No No No
Morocco 2017 No No No No No No
Monaco No No No No No No
Moldova No No 2013 No No No No
Madagascar 2017 No No Yes No Yes No
Maldives 2017 Joint Communique No No 2013 Yes No No No
Mexico No No No No No No
Marshall Islands No No No No No No
North Macedonia No No 2013 No No No No
Mali No No No No No No
Malta 2018 No No Yes No No No
Myanmar 2016 Joint Communique Yes Yes 2013 Yes No No Yes
Montenegro 2017 No No 2013 No No No No
Mongolia Yes Yes 2013 Yes Observer No Yes
Mozambique 2016 Yes No No No Yes No
Mauritania No No No No No No
Mauritius No No No No No No
Malawi No No No No No No
Malaysia Yes Yes 2013 Yes No Yes No
Namibia No No No No No No
Niger No No No No No No
Nigeria 2018 No No No No No No
Nicaragua No No No No No No
Netherlands No No Yes No No No
Norway No No Yes No No No
Nepal Yes No 2013 Yes Dialogue Yes Yes
Nauru No No No No No No
New Zealand 2017 No No Yes No No No
Oman 2018 No No 2013 Yes No Yes No
Pakistan 2016 2018 Joint Statement Yes Yes 2013 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panama 2017 No No No No No No
Peru No No No No No No
Philippines 2017 Joint Statement Yes Yes 2013 Yes No Yes No
Palau No No No No No No
Papua New Guinea 2016 Joint Communique Yes No No No No No
Poland 2015 No Yes 2013 Yes No No No
North Korea No No No No Yes Yes
Portugal 2018 Yes No Yes No No No
Paraguay No No No No No No
Qatar No No 2013 Yes No Yes No
Romania 2015 No No 2013 Yes No No No
Russia Yes Yes 2013 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rwanda 2018 No No No No No No
Saudi Arabia No No 2013 Yes No No No
Sudan No No Yes No Yes No
Senegal 2018 No No No No No No
Singapore 2018 Yes No 2013 Yes No Yes No
Solomon Islands No No No No No No
Sierra Leone 2018 No No No No No No
El Salvador No No No No No No
San Marino No No No No No No
Somalia 2018 No No No No Yes No
Serbia 2015 Yes Yes 2013 Yes No No No
South Sudan No No No No No No
Sao Tome and Principe No No No No No No
Suriname No No No No No No
Slovakia 2015 No No 2013 No No No No
Slovenia No No 2013 No No No No
Sweden No No Yes No No No
Eswatini No No No No No No
Seychelles 2018 No No No No No No
Syria No No 2013 No No Yes No
Chad No No No No No No
Togo No No No No No No
Thailand 2014 Joint Communique Yes No 2013 Yes No Yes No
Tajikistan Yes No 2013 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turkmenistan No No 2013 No No Yes No
Timor-Leste 2014 Joint Statement No No 2013 Yes No No No
Tonga 2018 MoU and Joint Communique No No No No No No
Trinidad and Tobago 2018 No No No No No No
Tunisia 2018 No No No No No No
Turkey 2015 No Yes 2013 Yes Dialogue Yes No
Tuvalu No No No No No No
Tanzania No No No No Yes No
Uganda No No No No No No
Ukraine 2017 No No 2013 No No No No
Uruguay No No No No No No
United States No No No No No No
Uzbekistan Yes Yes 2013 Yes Yes Yes No
St. Vincent and the Grenadines No No No No No No
Venezuela No No No No No No
Vietnam Yes Yes 2013 Yes No Yes Yes
Vanuatu 2018 No No Yes No No No
Samoa 2018 No No Yes No No No
Yemen No No 2013 No No Yes No
South Africa 2015 No No Yes No No No
Zambia No No No No No No
Zimbabwe No No No No No No
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